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SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AMERICAN
TOBACCO COMPANY CASE
WALLACE C. MuRCHISON*
Walter Lippmann once defined competition as something of which
producers have only as much as they cannot eliminate.' Certainly
efforts to eliminate competition have been at least as characteristic of
the American economy as competition itself. Free enterprise has been
under almost continuous attack by entrepreneurs who have attempted
to substitute trusts, combinations, price-fixing agreements, patent pools,
and so on for the automatic market mechanism under which price
equates supply and demand in a competitive system. To all such at-
tempts the Sherman Anti-Trust Act2 opposes a legal barrier. Its broad
prohibitions against restraints of trade and monopolies have been judi-
cially applied to meet each new threat, each new device which business
ingenuity has developed. Under it courts have condemned both the
crude predatory practices of the early trusts and the more subtle illegal-
ities of trade association statistical services. It is in the adaptability of
federal anti-trust enforcement to the changing masquerade of monopoly
that its strength and its possibilities for the future lie. Illustrative of
this adaptability and suggestive of future action under the Act is the
American Tobacco Company case,3 decided by the Supreme Court, in
June, 1946.
THE CASE
The Supreme Court decision was the culmination of six years of
complex and costly litigation.4 On July 24, 1940 a criminal information5
was filed in the federal court for the Eastern District of Kentucky,
charging eight major tobacco companies, 6 their subsidiaries and officials,
with violation of Sections 1 and 27 of the Sherman Act.8 The informa-
* Member of the Wilmington North Carolina Bar.
Quoted in Hearings before the'Temporary National Economic Committee,
Part 25, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 13085 (1941).
226 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§1-7 and 15 (1940).
'American Tobacco Co v. United States, 328 U. S. 781 (1946).
'Legal expenses were estimated at more than $1,000,000. Business Week,
Nov. 8, 1941, p. 18.
2 On the use of the information rather than grand jury indictment see 54
YALE L. J. 707 (1945).
'American Tobacco Company, Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company, R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Company, P. Lorillard Company, Imperial Tobacco Company,
British-American Tobacco Company, Philip Morris & Company, Universal Leaf
Tobacco Company.
Section 1 : "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with
foreign nations, is.hereby declared to be illegal. . . ." Section 2: "Every person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
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tion accused defendants, in four counts, of conspiracy in restraint of
trade, conspiracy to monopolize, attempt to monopolize, and monopoliza-
tion of the marketing of leaf tobacco and the production and distribution
of tobacco products. Before trial, the five smaller companies were
severed on pleas of nolo contendere, which subjected them to fines if
American Tobacco Company, Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company, and
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company9 were convicted. 10
After a five months' trial, during which evidence on all phases of
the tobacco business was introduced," the jury rendered a verdict of
guilty on all four counts, and the court imposed on both corporate and
individual defendants maximum fines totalling $255,000.12 The Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions in
-ix)3 pajuv2 noD uradnS aqj SV€6T q:a)le uJ st'061 'a~qta;)K
tiorari, limited to the question whether actual exclusion of competitors
was necessary to the crime of monopolization.14 This question the Court
answered adversely to appellants in a decision handed down June 10,
1946, unanimously affirming the judgment of the circuit court of appeals
and awarding final victory to the Government in the prolonged court
battle.15
The basic allegations of the Government's case were that the major
othfer person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor, ..." 26 StAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§1 and 2 (1940).
1 A two-year investigation of the industry by the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice preceded the filing of the criminal information. N. Y. Times,
July 25, .1940, p. 19, col. 8.
" Hereinafter called American, Liggett and Reynolds.
20 Brief for the United States in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari, p. 4.
This, of course, considerably eased the prosecution's task, permitting it to concen-
trate on the three undisputed leaders of the industry.
"A brief opinion of the district court on an issue of the admission of expert
opinion evidence appears in United States v. American Tobacco Co., 39 F. Supp.
957 (E. D. Ky. 1941).
"Maximum fine for any single violation of the Act is $5000. No fines were
imposed under the third count, the court ruling that the attempt to monopolize
was merged in the crime of monopolization. American Tobacco Co. v. United
States, 328 U. S. 781, 783. Total fines levied under the other three counts were
as follows: American, one subsidiary and four officers, $90,000; Liggett and four
officers, $75,000; Reynolds and five officers, $90,000. Record, pp. 6606-7. After
the Supreme Court decision, defendants who had pleaded nolo contendere were
fined a total of $42,000. P. Lorillard Co., Philip Morris & Co., and Imperial
Tobacco Co. each paid $9000; British-American Tobacco Co. and its subsidiary
Export Leaf Tobacco Co. together forfeited $9000; and Universal Leaf Tobacco
Co. -was fined $3000. Business Week, Oct. 5, 1946, p.•54.
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F. 2d 93 (C. C. A. 6th 1944).
14American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 324 U. S. 836 (1945). Reynolds'
petition for rehearing and enlargement of the scope of review was denied on April
23, 1945. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United States, 324 U. S. 891 (1945).
"American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781 (1946). Justices Reed
and Jackson did not participate in the decision. Justice Frankfurter concurred
but would have enlarged the scope of certiorari to permit consideration of alleged
errors in selection of the jury. Justice Rutledge concurred but expressed no opin-
ion on the issue- of possible multiple punishment under counts of consipracy in
restraint of trade, monopolization, and conspiracy to monopolize.
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tobacco companies had engaged in a conspiracy to control and manipu-
late the prices, conditions and instrumentalities of the marketing of leaf
tobacco and the manufacture and distribution of cigarettes and other
products, eliminating competition among themselves and suppressing the
competition of others, that this constituted a conspiracy in restraint of
trade, a conspiracy and attempt to monopolize, and, since it succeeded,
a monopolization of the industry.16 By monopolization the prosecution
meint the intentional acquisition and maintenance by defendants, as a
group, of power to dominate, control and exclude others from the in-
dustry.1 The evidence, for -the most -part circumstantial, which was
held by the circuit court of appeals sufficient to sustain the verdict of
the jury,18 may be briefly reviewed.
Dominant position of the Big Three. Ever since their emergence
from the dissolved tobacco trust in 1911,19 American, Liggett and
Reynolds have been the largest companies in a steadily expanding to-
bacco industry which has become predominantly a cigarette industry.
20
" Record, pp. 19, 25, 28, 32.
17 Record, pp. 25-6, quoted in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S.
at 784 n. 3.
x' American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F. 2d at 112.1 In United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106 (1911), the
Supreme Court declared the old American Tobacco Company an illegal combina-
tion under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and ordered its dissolution. The
decree of dissolution divided the assets among fourteen corporations, with Ameri-
can, Liggett and Reynolds receiving large holdings. United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 191 Fed. 371 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1911). See generally JONES, THE
TRUST PROBLEM IN THE UNmED STATES, 124 et seq. (1922); Cox, COMPETITION
IN THE AmERICAN ToBAcco INDUSTRY (1933). The circuit court's permanent in-junction forbade defendants "From continuing or carrying into further effect the
combination adjudged illegal in this cause, and from entering into or forming any
like combination or conspiracy, the effect of which is or will be to restrain com-
merce in tobacco or its products ... or to prolong the unlawful monopoly of such
commerce obtained and possessed by the defendants, as adjudged herein, ...
2. By making any express or implied agreement or arrangement together or one
with another like those adjudged illegal in this cause, relative to the control or
management of any of said 14 corporations, or the price or terms of purchase, or
of sale, of tobacco or any of its products, or the supplies or other products dealt
with in connection with the tobacco business, or relative to the purchase, sale,
transportation, or manufacture of tobacco, or its products or supplies, or other
products dealt with as aforesaid, by any of the parties hereto, which will have a
like effect in restraint of commerce . . . to that of the combination, the operation
of which is enjoined in this cause. . . .' United States v. American Tobacco Co.,
191 Fed. at 428-9. The Government might have proceeded against the Big Three
in 1940 for'a violation of this decree, instead of bringing the prosecution under
the Sherman Act. But such a proceeding for contempt of the decree would not
have included Philip Morris & Co., Imperial Tobacco Co. and Universal Leaf
Tobacco Co., would have necessitated proof of a combination and of arrangements
"like" the ones in the 1911 case, and would have been of limited value as a
precedent.
10 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. at 791 n. 7. In 1911 565
million pounds of leaf tobacco were used in the manufacture of all tobacco products
in the United States. In 1939 the figure was 885 million pounds: in 1945, 1.3
billion pounds. Of this leaf tobacco cigarettes consumed 7% in 1911, 57.5% in
1939, and 72% in 1945. ANN. REP. ON ToBAcco STATIsTIcs (U. S. Dep't Agric.
1937-46). In value as well as volume cigarettes outstripped other tobacco prod-
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These companies manufactured over 68% of the cigarettes, 63 9  of the
smoking tobacco., and 44% of the chewing tobacco produced in the
United States in 1939.21 During the decade 1930-39 their percentage
of domestic cigarette production dropped from 91% to 68%, but their
volume of production increased from 106 to 123 billion cigarettes, and
no outside competitor ever sold half as many cigarettes as the smallest
of the Big Three.22
In financial strength, as in production, American, Liggett and Reyn-
olds tower over actual and potential competitors. In 1939 the tangible
assets of American amounted to $237,130,931, of Liggett, $181,453,497,
of Reynolds, $176,709,822.23 Their combined tangible and intangible
assets in that year exceeded $649,000,000.24 Their net earnings for
1939, after taxes, were as follows: Reynolds, $26,645,455: American,
$26,427,934; Liggett, $20,705,549.25 Their tremendous expenditures
for advertising (over $40,000,000 in 1939)20 warn new or potential
entrants of the costly outlays necessary to compete for sales. Their
three year stocks of leaf tobacco, valued at over $100,000,000 for each
company, are heavy overhead items, but they assure independence of
the farmers' market in any one year.2 7
The strategic position of these three dominant manufacturers is en-
hanced by the nature of the markets in which they deal. Their chief
raw material is bought from thousands of tobacco farmers in over 100
auction markets throughout the South. 28  Leaf tobacco is perishable
unless redried, and the farmers have no facilities for redrying; they
ucts; for example, cigarettes made up 93% of American's sales in 1944, 71.5%
of P. Lorillard's sales in 1942, and 97% of Philip Morris' sales in 1940. MooDY's
INDusTRILs, 1957, 2480, 2684 (1946).
-
1 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. at 796. The best avail-
able figures for a period of years do not show the proportion of total production
of tobacco products attained by the three companies, but only the share of the
three leading cigarette brands-Lucky Strike (American), Camel (Reynolds),
Chesterfield (Liggett)-in the national consumption picture:
1930 87.7% 1936 74.3% 1942 62.6%
931 88.7% 1937 71.9% 1943 65.6%
932 78.7% 1938 69.5% 1944 66.9%
1933 81.9% 1939 662% 1945 69.0%
1934 77.5% 1940 63.6% 1946 73.20
1935 75.7% 1941 62.1%
STANDARD & POOR'S INDUSTRY SuavY: Tomcco, Part II, T4-5, April 10, 1946;
N. Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1947, p: 28, col. 4.22 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. at 795.2 American.Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F. 2d at 100. By way of
comparison, in 1939 the total assets of P. Lorillard Co. were $57,500,000, and those
of Philip Morris & Co. were $37,100,000. MooDy's I-DUSTRIALS 2480, 2684 (1946)
and prior years.
2 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F. 2d at 100.25 Ibid.
2 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. at 797.
27 Id. at 799.28 Id. at 800.
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must sell their tobacco in the season in which it is raised or lose it.2
The cigarettes, smoking and chewing tobacco made from this leaf are
sold through a million or more jobbers, wholesalers and retailers through-
out the country.30  With the nation wide popular demand, .maintained
by advertising, for Lucky Strikes, Chesterfields and Camels, storekeep-
ers of all types as a practical matter must handle these and similar
brands. They cannot hold out for higher profit margins or resist
manufacturer interference in their business.
The marked superiority of the Big Three in resources and produc-
tion and their concentrated power in relation to sources of supply and
channels of dlistribution carried with it ample opportunity for abuse.
The jury verdict indicates that the opportunity was utilized in both
major segments of the tobacco industry.
Leaf tobacco marketing. In the auction markets where farmers sell
their tobacco, buyers representing American, Liggett and Reynolds are
accorded the respect their quantity purchases warrant. These com-
panies together purchased between 50% and 80% of the flue-cured
tobacco bought by domestic producers (about one-half the annual crop
is exported, chiefly to England), between 60% and 80% of all burley
tobacco, and the greater part of the Maryland tobacco crop.3 ' From
the practices of the companies, as the largest buyers on the markets and
as members of the Tobacco Association of the United States,3 2 the jury
inferred that a conspiracy to fix prices and "rig" the markets existed.
None of the Big Three would buy on any market unless the others
were also represented.3 3 Since a market vhithout their presence would
be a failure, the opening of new markets depended on their unanimous
consent, arrived at by consultation.3" Market regulations were laid
down by the Tobacco Association in which they, but not the farmers,
were represented.35 In separate instructions to their buyers the com-
panies set top prices or price ranges for the various grades of tobacco,
and in practice these maximum prices were the same for all of them.3 6
Thus, under an auction custom awarding sales to the first of the bid-
ders, company buyers often bid for leaf at the understood ceiling price
before an opening price was announced, thus establishing prior claim
to the tobacco at that price.37 Similarly, buyers bid ahead on baskets
farther down the line, and without mention of price the auctioneer
awarded them these baskets at the understood ceiling.38
29 Id. at 799. 20 Id. at 804. ' Id. at 799.
2This Association, composed of manufacturers, buyers, warehousemen and
others connected with the industry, but excluding farmers, sets the dates for open-
ing the flue-cured markets and passes regulations on sales, etc. Id. at 800.
" Id. at 800. The foreign purchasers likewise would not participate without the
presence of the Big Three. Id. at 801.
31 Id. at 801. 35 Id. at 800. -. Id. at 801.37 Id. at 801-2. 31 Id. at 802.
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Restriction of-competition was also accomplished in other ways. Each
company formulated distinctive grades of tobacco which it alone pur-
chased, 9 and the other companies did not compete for these grades. 40
Before the market seasons opened each company separately informed
its buyers what percentage of the flue-cured, burley and Maryland to-
bacco crop it wished to purchase, and its buyers limited their acquisitions
on each market to this percentage.41 However, competition was not
so completely eliminated that a company could buy its tobacco at any
price it wished. Each company was much more concerned that all three
should pay the same price for the same quality tobacco than that any
particular prices be maintained.4 Where one or two of them had
secured their percentages on a market or were not interested in par-
ticular leaf offerings, their buyers nevertheless would enter the bidding
to force the others up to their ceiling prices. 43 Company supervisors,
through instructions to buyers on prices and percentages, strove to main-
tain the same prices and grades and to achieve stability on all markets.44
During the early Thirties when ten-cent cigarettes were gaining
rapidly at the expense of the standard or fifteen-cent brands, 45 the Big
Three began making large purchases of the cheaper leaf used in the
manufacturer of ten-cent cigarettes. This tobacco was not substituted
for the moie expensive grades in Luckies, Chesterfields and Camels, and
no explanation of its use was offered. The Government claimed that
the purchases evidenced a conspiracy to deprive the markers of ten-cent
cigarettes of their chief raw material and by increasing their tobacco costs
raise their cigarette prices or otherwise choke off their competition. 4
Sale of tobacco products. References to the "fierce competition" in
the tobacco industry describe the strenuous efforts of cigarette manufac-
tirers to outsell their rivals by superior sales promotion campaigns.
There is certainly no competition in price.47 The list prices and dis-
counts of American, Liggett and Reynolds were practically identical
from 1923 and absolutely identical from 1928 to the time of trial.48
Between 1928 and 1940 only seven price changes were made by the
three companies and they were identical in amount.49 Although the
changes were not announced by all companies on the same day, they
11 The differences between these grades were distinguishable by highly trained
special buyers but they did not accord with the government grades and were "in
reality so minute as to be inconsequential." American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
328 U. S. at 802.
40 Ibid. "Id. at 803. "Id. at 802.3Ibid. "Id. at 803. "' See infra p. 145.
' American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. at 803-4.
'"A modern survey states: "Competition is limited to promotion technique
since all major producers adhere to a single price schedule." STANDARD & POOR'S
INDUSTRY SURVEY: TOBACCO, Part II T4-15, April 21, 1944.
8 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. at 804.
'2I/n'.
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were in effect simultaneous, because after the announcement by one
company and before the other companies had followed suit they refused
to sell to dealers at their unchanged price.50
The most serious misstep of the Big Three, one which revealed their
monopoly power and precipitated their difficulties with the ten-cent
cigarettes, was the price increase of 1931. In that year, with their
share of total cigarette production over 90y, leaf tobacco costs at their'
lowest and depression gripping the country, the companies, Reynolds
leading, raised the list price of cigarettes from $6.40 to $6.85 per thou-
sand.51  No economic justification for this move was demonstrated.52
Although their sales volume dropped greatly, combined net profits ex-
ceeded $100,M,000. 53  It was one of the three best years in their
history.
Since the demand for cigarettes is comparatively inelastic, as sales
of Lucky Strikes, Camels, and Chesterfields declined sales of ten-cent
cigarettes increased until in November, 1932 they had absorbed 23%
of the national market.54 Counterattack by the Big Three followed.
Two price cuts in early 1933 necessitated sales of Camels and Lucky
Strikes at a loss but brought victory over the ten-cent brands.5 5 By
May, 1933 these brands were making only 6.4% of the total cigarette
sales." In January, 1934 the price of the Big Three brands was raised
from the low of $5.50 to $6.10 a thousand.57  The only subsequent
changes were increases in 1937 and 1940, the latter occasioned by an
advance in the federal tax rate. 58
In both the elimination of price competition among themselves and
the concerted assault on their lower-priced competitors, the three leading
manufacturers found it necessary to control the prices at which their
products were sold by distributors. They insisted on identical whole-
sale and retail prices for their brands, based on equality of factory
10 Id. at 808.
" Id. at 805. The net price, after deducting discounts and federal tax of $3.00
per thousand, was increased from $2.64 to $3.04.Ibid. Reynolds' president stated that it was "to express our own courage
for the future and our own confidence in our industry." The president of Ameri-
can saw an opportunity to make money and felt impelled to follow Reynolds in
order to have the same funds for advertising. Liggett's officials thought the in-
crease was a mistake but did not wish to be deprived of the resources for greater
advertising. Ibid.
53 Id. at 806.
5,Ibid.
Id. at 806-7. The first cut, in January, 1933, was from $6.85 to $6.00 a
thousand. The second, in February, 1933, lowered the list price to $5.50 a thousand.
Liggett had to curtail all expenses, especially advertising, in order to sell Chester-
fields at this price. Ibid.
" Id. at 807.
5 Ibid.58Ibid. The cigarette tax, which had been $3.00 a thousand since 1919, was
raised to $3.25, effective July 1, 1940. A further increase to $3.50 was made on
Nov. 1, 1942. ANN. REP. ON ToBAcco STAtistics 50 (1946).
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prices. 59 Finding that a differential of not more than three cents a
pack between their brands and the ten-cent cigarettes would enable them
to outsell the latter, they demanded that retailers maintain this differ-
ential, either by raising the price of the cheaper cigarettes or charging
less for the standard brands.60 The evidence that Big Three repre-
sentatives acted together in enforcing this policy was one of the few
direct proofs of collusion in the case. 61
Another set of circumstances justifying the inference of conspiracy
occurred at the height of the price war, when American, Liggett and
Reynolds sought to lower the retail price of their cigarettes to ten cents
per pack. Before the factory price cut of February 11, 1933 was an-
nounced to the trade, the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company pre-
pared posters advertising new retail prices and on February 10th sent
out instructions to its 15,000 stores to charge ten cents for the leading
brands, effective the next day. 2 Allegedly this action was taken with-
out advance notice from any of the manufacturers and solely on the
basis of unconfirmed rumors of the trade63
In order to control distributors' prices64 the Big Three rewarded
cooperating dealers with the privilege of purchasing direct from the
manufacturer and gave them discounts, advertising displays, cash sub-
sidies and free goods. 65 The companies withdrew or withheld these
benefits from recalcitrant dealers and subsidized competing dealers as
price cutters to maintain the price parity of the leading brands and
enforce the three-cent price differential.66
To show opportunity for communication and agreement the Govern-
ment presented evidence of the activities of the Tobacco Merchants
Association and the companies' heavy financial contributions to it.
Representatives of the three manufacturers were in constant touch with
the director of the Association, participated in its meetings and worked
through it for certain common objectives, such as defeating proposed
state cigarette taxes.67
" American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. at 808; American To-
bacco Co.. v. United States, 147 F. 2d at 105.:0 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. at 807.
'
1American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F. 2d at 106.
, Ibid. 03 Ibid.
Cigarette manufacturers have not fixed the retail prices of their products
under state resale price maintenance statutes. Prior to the passage in 1937 of the
Miller-Tydings Amendment to the Sherman Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended,
50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U. S. C. §1 (1940), resale price maintenance in interstate
commerce -was held a violation of federal antitrust law. Dr. Miles Medical Co.
v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (1911). Under the Miller-Tydings Amendment
the tobacco companies can lawfully fix retail and wholesale prices in accordance
with state statutes, but in spite of continual appeals from tobacco distributors they
have not done so. See, for example, unanimous resolution of the convention of the
National Ass'n of Tobacco Distributors, N. Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1946, p. 30, col. 8.
" American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. at 808.
6 Ibid. " American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F. 2d at 119.
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Viewing the evidence as a whole, the jury found that American,
Liggett and Reynolds had wielded their tremendous power in concert
to undermine the farmers' bargaining position, to fix prices of both leaf
tobacco and tobacco products, to restrain competition among them-
selves, to injure the business of competing manufacturers and to coerce
and control the distributors of cigarettes and allied tobacco products.
The legal questions. Although from a record of over 10,000 pages
innumerable assignments of error could be extracted,6 the issues directly
related to antitrust law were quite limited in number, and all but one
were conclusively settled by the circuit court of appeals.
Appellants contended strongly that the verdict was not supported by
the evidence, that there was no proof of violations of the Act. The
question for the circuit court of appeals was whether there was sub-
stantial evidence from which the jury properly could have found or
inferred, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendants were guilty.69 The
court's answer was a clear affirmative.70 Admittedly no express or
formal agreement to restrain trade or monopolize was shown, but such
evidence is rarely available and is not essential to a criminal conspiracy
case.71  Proof of an agreement, combination or conspiracy was, as the
trial court instructed, an "essential element" of the crimes charged, 2
but, in the words of the appellate court, "The agreement may be shown
by a concert of action, all the parties working together understandingly,
with a single design for the accomplishment of a common purpose, ' 73
and ". . . the essential agreement, combination and conspiracy in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act may be implied from, or found in a course of
dealing or other circumstances, as well as through an exchange of
words."7 4
The Supreme Court went. even further:
"This particular conspiracy may well have derived special vital,
ity, in the eyes of the jury, from the fact that its existence was
established, not through the presentation of a formal written agree-
ment, but through the evidence of widespread and effective con-
duct on the part of petitioners in relation to their existing or
potential competitors. '7 5
" The record proper contained eight printed volumes, and there were six vol-
umes of exhibits. Record, pp. 6595, 6723. One hundred thirty-three assignments
of error were made to the circuit court of appeals. Record, pp. 6481-6515.
" American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. at 787 n. 4.
"oAmerican Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F. 2d at 112.
"' Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60 (1942) ; United States v. Manton, 107
F. 2d 834 (C. C. A. 2d 1938).
2American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. at 785-6.
"' American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F. 2d at 107, citing Marino v.
United States, 91 F. 2d 691 (C. C. A. 9th 1937).
"Ibid., citing United States v. A. Schrader's Son, 252 U. S. 85 (1920). See
infra, pp. 157-159.American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. at 789.
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Given the fact that a conspiracy existed, was it the type of combina-
tion condemned by the Sherman Act? As to a conspiracy in restraint
of trade under Section 1 of the Act there could be little room for doubt.
The companies had combined to fix leaf tobacco and cigarette prices.
Price fixing is per se a restraint of trade, whether the prices fixed are
reasonable or unreasonable, rigid or flexible. 74 The companies had
acted together to control resale prices and distribution of tobacco prod-
ucts. Such schemes, even when indulged in by a single manufacturer
and his distributors, are illegal restraint of trade.77
The two 'counts charging conspiracy to monopolize and monopoliza-
tion in- contravention of Section 2 presented the only novel question.
The trial court defined the term "monopolization" as " the joint acqui-
sition or maintenance by the members of a conspiracy formed for that
purpose, of the power to control and dominate interstate trade and com-
merce in a commodity to such an extent that they are able, as a group,
to exclude actual or potential competitors from the field, accompanied
with the intention and purpose to exercise such power."78  The circuit
court of appeals approved this definition and held the evidence war-
ranted a jury finding that the Big Three, in combination, had power to
exclude competitors and the intent to exercise that power. 9 Under the
limited review granted by the Supreme Court this was the only issue
before it, and the Court completely agreed that neither proof of actual
exclusion nor of exertion of power to exclude existing or potential com-
petitors was essential to the crime of monopolization.8 0 Although the
precise issue had not been previously decided by the Court, language
in several earlier cases pointed toward the conclusion reached.8'
" United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150 (1940); United
States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U. S. 392 (1927).
" United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U. S. 707 (1944) ; United
States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U. S. 265 (1942) ; Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United
States, 309 t. S. 436 (1940) ; Federal Trade Comm'n v. Beech-Nut Packing Co.,
257 U. S. 441 (1922) ; United States v. A. Schrader's Son, 252 U. S. 85 (1920).
8 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. at 785.
" American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F. 2d at 109-12.
:0 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. at 810.
ai "This acquisition placed the Holding Company in a position of dominating
control not only over two great competing interstate railroad carriers but also
over two great competing coal companies .... That such a power, so obtained,
regardless of the use made of it, constitutes a menace to and an undue restraint
upon interstate commerce within the meaning of the Anti-Trust Act, has been
frequently held by this court." United States v. Reading Co., 253 U. S. 26, 57
(1920) ; "It is the scope of'such combinations and their power to suppress or stifle
competition or create monopoly which determines the applicability of the act."
United States v. Union Pacific R. R., 226 U. S. 61, 88 (1912); "The mere ex-
istence of such a combination and the power acquired by the holding company as
its trustee, constituted a menace to, and a direct restraint up6n, that freedom of
commerce which Congress intended to recognize and protect, and which the public
is entitled to have protected." Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S.
197, 327 (1904); accord, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150,
226 n. 59 (1940); Harriman v. Northern Securities Co., 197 U. S. 244, 291 (1905) ;
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 429-32 (C. C. A. 2d
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THIE THrEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
The full significance of the judicial outcome in the American To-
bacco Company case cannot be understood except in relation to economic
theory, for the whole purpose of the Sherman Act is to preserve and
protect a particular form of economic system, namely, free competitive
capitalism.8 2
Statement of the theory. Under free competition supply and demand
for a commodity are brought into equilibrium at a market price which
encourages full production by each competitor, the most efficient scale
of production in his enterprise and economic benefits to society as a
whole. Such competition, however, assumes two vital conditions-a
large number of sellers, and a standardized commodity sold in a single
market.83 Under these conditions, perhaps exemplified in the grain
-market, the individual seller produces on the assumption that his entire
output can be disposed of at the market price. For him market price
is a given quantity, demand is virtually unlimited, and his output is
expanded until the cost of producing one more unit equals the market
price. If the price which equates supply and demand yields high profits,
new competitors enter the industry, and a new equilibrium price and a
more productive use of resources follow.
So much for the familiar learning of pure competition, i.e., com-
petition without monopoly elements. Suppose, however, that the two
fundamental conditions do not exist, that there are only a few sellers
and their products are differentiated. Professor Chamberlin and others 4
have demonstrated that the resulting situation, which Chamberlin calls
monopolistic competition, is quite different from pure competition, and
1945); United States v. Patten, 187 Fed. 664, 672 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1911);
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 164 Fed. 700, 721 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
1908); ef. Lynch v. Magnavox Co., 94 F. 2d. 883, 888 (C. C. A. 9th 1938). But
cf. "The law, however, does not make the mere size of a corporation, however
impressive, or the existence of unexerted power on its part, an offense, when
unaccompanied by unlawful conduct in the exercise of its power." United States
v. International Harvester Co., 274 U. S. 693, 708 (1927) ; Montrose Lumber Co.
v. United States, 124 F. 2d 573, 578 (C. C. A. 10th 1941) ; Patterson v. United
States, 222 Fed. 599, 619 (C. C. A. 6th 1915) ; Aluminum Co. of America, 44 F.
Supp. 97, 155 (S. D. N. Y. 1941), rev'd, 148 F. 2d 416 (C. C. A. 2d 1945) ; United
States v. National Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n, 40 F. Supp. 448, 456 (D. Colo.
1941). Compare United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417, 451(1920), with Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 496 n. 10 (1940).
" "The end sought was the prevention of restraints to free competition in busi-
ness and commercial transactions which tended to restrict production, raise prices
or otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of
goods and services, all of which had come to be regarded as a special form of
public injury." Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 493 (1940).
" CHAmBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MoNOPoLIsTIc COMPETITION 6-25 (5th ed.1946).1,BURNs, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION (1936); RoBINsoN, THE ECONOmics
OF IMPERFEcT COMPETITION (1933); WARE AND MEANS, THE MODERN EcoNOMY
IN Acriox (1936); Cohen, The Anti-Trust Acts and Monopolistic Competition,
24 CORN. L. Q. 80 (1938).
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"it is no longer safe even in theory to assume that its social results are
salutary. '8 5
With only a few sellers the individual producer can no longer ignore
the elfects of his policies on the market price. He must take into
account not only his direct influence, through the price he sets on his
goods and the quantity he puts on the market, but also his indirect
influence on price, through the effect of his action on the policies of
the other sellers.86 For example, a price cut may appear advantageous
to one cigarette manufacturer in view of the rival's present policy, but
he must recognize that his reduction will be met by his rival, and in the
end each will be selling approximately the same share of a less valuable
market.8 7
"To the argument that if he did not cut his rival would, the
answer is that his rival would not for the same reason that he does
not. If each seeks his maximum profit rationally and intelligently
. . . no one will cut, and although the sellers are entirely inde-
pendent, the equilibrium result is the same as though there were
a monopolistic agreement between them."' 8
Assuming immediate response by one selldr to another's move, and
a minmum of uncertainty on .the part of one as to the other's probable
reaction, each will sell at the same price and it will be a monopoly price.
The explanation is that each producer is attempting to maximize his
profits under conditions which require him to consider his total influence
on price. No agreement, tacit or otherwise, is necessary.8 9
The second requirement of pure competition is a standardized com-
modity9° sold in a single market. With no basis for buyer preference of
one producer's commodity over another, demand for each seller's product
is highly elastic; an increase in his price will send his buyers to other
sellers.9 But where products are differentiated, either actually or in
the minds of buyers,0 2 the situation is more nearly that of competing
8 Fly, Observations on the Anti-Trust Laws, Economic Theory and the Sugar
Institute Decisions'I, 45 YAlE L. J. 1339, 1343 (1936).8 CHAMBE LIN, supra note 83, at 30-55.
87This assumes either (1) substantially inelastic total demand, that is, a re-
duction in price brings only a small increase, or no increase in total consumption,
or (2) an elastic demand for cigarettes but a smaller total profit for manufacturers
on the increased volume than on the old volume at a higher price. Actually, in-
elasticity of demand is characteristic of the tobacco industry because of habit-
forming tendencies and brand promotion and devotion.
88 CHAMBERLIN, supra note 83, at 48.89 Id. at 31.
go "Commodity" covers both characteristics of the product itself and conditions
surrounding its sale, including quality, design, packaging, service, location of sale,
etc. Id. at 7-8, 56.11 BURNS, supra note 84, at 3.
92 A general class of product is differentiated if any significant basis exists for
distingnishing the goods of one seller from those of another. CHAMBERLIN, supra
note 83. at 56.
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monopolies.9 3 For example, American Tobacco Company has a monop-
oly of Lucky Strike cigarettes, but Lucky Strikes compete with other
brands of cigarettes, with other tobacco products, such as cigars, and
to a much smaller extent with other substitutes, such as candy and
chewing gum. Under monopolistic competition a seller's ability to
charge a monopoly price is limited only by the presence of substitutes
and the elasticity of demand for his product. In the case of Lucky
Strikes these factors prevent sale at a higher price than other leading
brands, but price differentials exist in the face of standard quality in
aspirin, soda and other drugs. And uniformity of price among cigarette
brands is not indicative of pure competition, where neither of the con-
ditions of such competition are present.
Advertising and similar promotion are crucial to product differen-
tiation. They inform buyers of real and impress them with fancied
differences in commodities. The theory of monopolistic competition
recognizes that advertising may increase the demand for a particular
brand, decrease the elasticity of that demand, and raise the total de-
mand for products of the same general class.9 4 But the costs of such
promotion and the inelasticity of demand achieved mean that prices are
inevitably higher than under pure competition. 5 Of course, high prices
do not necessarily produce monoply profits; heavy production and sell-
ing costs9" and development of. excess productive capacity may reduce
earnings to competitive levels. 1 However, advertising, which raises
costs, at the same time increases the possibility of monopoly profits by
partially protecting the field against the incursions of new competition. 8
Although both types of competition have the same driving force-
maximization of profits-different basic conditions bring about higher
prices, lower production, less effective utilization of resources and less
flexible adjustment to changes under monopolistic than under pure com-
petition. And to these obvious economic disadvantages must be added
a tendency to accentuate the business cycle and to decrease employment
opportunities.09
" Id. c. 5. 91 Id. at 117-29.
" Id. at 166. That is not to say, however, that monopolistic competition with
advertising may not produce a cheaper product than monopolistic competition with-
out advertising, through possible economies in large scale production. Id. at 130-66.
"' Selling costs are costs which alter the demand curve for a product. Pro-
duction costs are those which do not. Id. at 123.
07Id. at 88, 100-14.
" Id. at 173. This tendency was noted by the Supreme Court in the tobacco
industry. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. at 797 (1946).
"'With the uniformity and stability of administered prices under monopolistic
competition, adjustments are made largely through changes in production. During
the downward phase of a business cycle manufacturing prices tend to be relatively
inflexible, output falls off, employment drops, and additional shock is thrown on
the more flexible parts of the economy, such as agriculture. Means, Industrial
Prices and Their Relative Inflexibility, SEN. Doc. No. 13, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.(1935).
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Application to the tobacco industry. An economic theory which
analyzes competition containing monopoly elements is much more re-
alistic than the old distillation of pure competition and pure monopoly,
but in actual fact no market is without monopoly elements, and the
economists have not yet furnished us tests to measure with accuracy the
degrees of monopoly and its harmful results to society. In the absence
of such tests and the complete data necessary for such measurement,
only rough estimates are possible, but the extent to which the funda-
mental conditions of pure competition have been replaced and the history
of operations in the tobacco industry indicate a rather high proportion
of monopoly in the compound of monopolistic competition undeniably
present therein.
The industry is certainly one of huge size and a limited number
of producers. Six firms'0 0 averaged 94.2% of the total cigarette sales
from 1931 through" 1939,101 and estimates of production since that date
reveal no substantial change in this figure.'02 Concentration of business
in a few companies is also characteristic of the other branches of the
industry, although less marked in cigar manufacturing.10 3 Cigarette
prices have been uniform for all major brands 04 and price stability has
been achieved. 0 5 Each company takes into account the effect of its100 American, Reynolds, Liggett, Philip Morris & Co., P. Lorillard Co. (Old
Golds), Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co. (Raleighs).
"I Ameriban Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. at 794. Peak year was
1931 with 98.3% and lowest year was 1939 with 91.5% of total domestic produc-
tion. Ibid.
102 Estimates for just the leading brands of these six firms show an average of
82.55% of total cigarette sales in the years 1940-45. The comparable figure for
1931-39 was 83.96%. STANDARD & POOR'S INDUSRY SuRvEY: ToBAcco, Part II,
T4-5, April 10, 1946. In 1946 Lucky Strikes, Camels and Chesterfields comprised
73.2% of all cigarettes produced. N. Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1947, p. 28, col. 6.
... American, Liggett, Reynolds and Lorillard produced 74% of the smoking
tobacco and 70% of the chewing tobacco in 1934, but only 15% of the cigars. In
1934 United States Tobacco Co., American Snuff Co. and George W. Helme Co.
made 95% -of domestic snuff sales. In the combined chewing and smoking tobacco
and snuff branches the largest four enterprises produced 64% and the largest
eight 84% of the product in 1935. In cigars, however, the largest four produced
only 39% and the largest eight 51% of the total. Report of the Smaller War
Plants Corp., Economic Concentration and World War II, SEN. Doc. No. 206,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 227-32 (1946). The above report lists the tobacco industry
as the second most concentrated industry in America. Concentration is measured
in three'ways: (1) Employment-percentage of all workers employed by concerns
with more than 500 employees (tobacco industry, 78.3%); (2) Production-pro-
portion which value of different tobacco products manufactured under conditions
where four largest producers of each product manufactured from 75% to 100%
of that product bears to the total value of all products (tobacco industry, 86.4%) ;(3) Sales-percentage of total volume of sales made by corporations with assets
of $50,000,000 and over (tobacCo industry, 73.5%). Id. at 66-75.
10o See supra pp. 144-145.
'05 From 1930 to 1946 there were only nine changes in the price of standard
cigarette brands, and two were due to increased federal tax rates. Net factory
price, after discounts and excluding federal tax, remained the same from 1931 to
1933, from 1934 to 1937, and from 1937 to 1941, when OPA action prevented
change until 1946. OPA Revised Price Schedule No. 62-Cigarettes (as amended),
7 FEI. REG. 1332, 1836, 2132, 2242, 8948 (1942), 9 FED. RE. 2667 (1944), 11 FED.
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price on its rivals' policies, prices move together,10 6 and product prices
are higher than under pure competition-witness the 1931 price in-
crease. Although leaf tobacco prices have fluctuated widely, 01 7 there
can be little doubt that their general level is lowered by reason of the
small number of buyers in the market.' 08
Differentiation of product, chiefly by advertising, has reached a high
peak in the tobacco business. Advertising has proved its effectiveness
in shifting demand among particular brands ;109 how much of a factor it
has been in the growth of total tobacco consumption is not clear." 0 With
continually expanding consumption, however, large scale promotion may
attract new smokers to one producer's brand without cutting seriously
into existing sales volume of a competing brand and inviting uneconomic
retaliation; this has probably been a factor in the huge size of cigarette
advertising budgets."' Although refined differentiation and energetic
promotion of tobacco products undoubtedly have increased the natural
RE. 4609 (1946); ANN. REP. OF TOBACCO STATISTICS (U. S. Dep't Agric. 1937-
46) ; STANDARD & POOR, supra note 102, at T4-3; Tobacco, Oct. 10, 1946, p. 3, Oct.
17, 1946, p. 3. A contributing factor to this stability of price has been the com-
panies method of accounting for leaf costs on the basis of a three-year average.
This reduces the tendency of fluctuating leaf costs to cause changes in cigarette
prices. Cox, COMPETITION IN THE AmERIcAN TOBACCO INDUSTRY 191 (1933).
1"For example, in mid-1946 after OPA's demise, Liggett raised the price of
Chesterfields 22 cents a thousand, effective August 1, 1946. 'The other manufac-
turers did not follow. On August 6th Liggett rescinded the price increase. N. Y.
Times, July 31, 1946, p. 29, August 7, 1946, ). 29.107 ANN. REP. OF TOBACCO STATISTICS (1937-46).
.08 Monopolistic competition works the same way in a market with few buyers
and many sellers as in one with few sellers. If one buyer considers bidding higher
to obtain more leaf he knows his rivals will bid high also and each will obtain in
the end about the same share, but at a higher price. So each buyer restrains his
bidding and without agreement among the buyers the price is lower than a purely
competitive one.
"I See ANNUAL REPORT OF TEE AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY 14 (1945):
"The record proves that the amount of money spent on cigarette advertising is
modest in relation to the sales results achieved." Average advertising expenses
for Lucky Strikes from 1934 to 1943 were 12.7 cents per 1,000 cigarettes. lb-id.
Evidently American was able to hold or improve its position during this period
with a smaller advertising budget than Reynolds or Liggett. For relative sales
trends of major cigarette companies, 1934-45, see STANDARD & POOR, smpra note
102, at T4-4.
110 Cox, supra note 105, at 222-5. Standard & Poor suggest three reasons for
the constant growth of tobacco consumption-habit forming tendency of its use,
more rapid expansion of adult population than total population, and long term
rising trend of consumer incomes. Over the course of a business cycle total
tobacco consumption shows a striking relation to fluctuations in the national income.
STANDARD & POOR, supra note 102, at T4-1.
Cox, supra note 105. at 229-32. Size of cigarette advertising budgets is
indicated by the estimate that from 1939 to 1942 the tobacco industry spent an
average of approximately $40,000,000 annually for national advertising through
newspapers, magazines, farm journals and radio broadcasting. BORDEN, TAYLOR
AND HOvDE, NATIONAL ADVERTISING IN NEWSPAPERS 63 (1946). During the above
period network radio climbed to 42% of the total expenditure, newspapers dropped
sharply to 33% and magazines increased slightly to 23%. Id. at 44. In 1940 the
cigarette industry as a whole expended 11.3% of total revenues on advertising;
only two industries, drugs and cereals, spent more. Report of the Smaller War
Plants Corp., supra note 103, at 231.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
inelasticity of demand for these products, the outstanding contribution
of such promotion to monopoly in the industry has been in the exclusion
of potential coinpetition. This is recognized in the frank statement of
a recent survey:
"The chief barrier to new competition is found in the large
advertising expenses required to establish any brand in volume....
The large capital investment in inventory and the sizable promo-
tional expenditures required to launch a new brand promise that
the cigarette market, as far ahead as can be seen, will continue to
be divided among the existing companies. 11 2
In a major manufacturing industry characterized by few producers,
wide spread differentiation of product, steadily rising productiont1 3 and
serious obstacles to potential competition the existence of monopoly prof-
its would not be surprising. From 1912 to 1930 the return on book
value of net investment of American, Liggett, Reynolds and Lorillard
averaged 12.4%, varying between a low of 9.52% (1914) and a high
of 15.95% (1930). 114 Reynolds led the field with a return of almost
20% for the period.115 The ratio of net earnings (after taxes) to net
worth for the same companies from 1931 to 1946 averaged 11.56%,
with extremes of 8.44% in 1945 and 14.28% in 1931.110 Including
Philip Morris with the above four firms increases the sixteen-year
average to 12.98%.117 The ability of the large tobacco companies to
earn handsome profits compares most favorably with the record of other
American manufacturers 118 and tobacco distributors. 11
112 STANDARD & POOR, smpra note 102, at T4-4. Size of investment in inventory
is illustrated by the fact that of Liggett's total assets of $293,400,000 in 1945,
$253,300,000 or 86.34% was inventory. Good will was listed as a $1 assets, how-
ever. MooDY's INDUSTRIALS 2439 (1946).
11. Of the 45 years from 1900 to 1945 there have been only 10 in which the
amount of leaf tobacco processed has not shown an increase over the preceding year.
And from 1920 to 1945 per capita consumption of cigarettes rose every year except
four-1930, 1931, 1932, 1938. ANN. REP. OF TOBACCO STATISTICS (1937-46).
11 Cox, stpra note 105, at 272. Book value of net investment is total of bonds,
stocks and surplus. Earnings are after taxes. Source of statistics was annual
reports of the companies. Id. at 270.
"
5 Id. at 271.
... From MOODY'S INDUSTRIALS 1957, 1970, 2439, 2480 (1946), and prior years.
The low rate of return in 1945 was probably due to OPA ceilings and rising
tobacco costs. Earnings jumped to 10.65% of net worth for the four firms in
1946.
1.. MOODY'S INDUSTRIALS 2684 (1946), and prior years. The 1931L46 mean ratio
of earnings to net worth for each of the five companies was as follows: Philip
Morris, 18.62% (1933-46 aver.) ; Reynolds, 15.63%; Liggett, 12.90%; American,
10.67%; Lorillard, 7.00%. Ibid.
118 A study of 2,046 manufacturing corporations, responsible for one-half Amer-
ican manufacturing, showed an average rate of return (before federal taxes) on
capitalization (excluding funded debt) from 1919 to 1928 of 10.8%. The rate of
return for 23 tobacco corporations was 14.2%, for 17 bakery companies 16.8%,
for 16 canned goods companies 13.8%, for 111 paper firms 9.6%, and for 23 meat
packing corporations 1.9%. EPSTEIN, INDUSTRIAL PROFITS IN TIIE" UNITED STATES
242.119A During the years 1929-35 the rate of return on investment for 13 tobacco
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The existence of monopolistic competition in the tobacco industry,
noted by several writers,'120 was implicitly recognized by both sides in
the recent antitrust litigation. Under counts of monopolization and
attempting to monopolize the Government's information charged:
"In adopting and exercising such methods, means and practices,
each defendant has acted with full knowledge that unanimity of
action with reference thereto was and would be the policy, intent
and practice of the others, that such unanimity of action would
necessarily result in drawing to defendant major tobacco com-
panies as a group the power to dominate, control, and exclude
others from, the aforesaid interstate . . . commerce, has intended
such result, and such result has in fact been achieved.'
u2 1
And in its reply brief American presented the issue as follows:
"The real question is whether in an industry such as this, the
anti-trust laws are violated by uniformity of conduct, where normal
business factors cause each company, acting individually, to adopt
practices and policies that are, in many instances, similar to those
of its competitors.' u
2 2
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECIsIoN
Before evaluating the significance of the American Tobacco Com-
pany case from the point of view of the three groups most concerned
with its meaning and effect-the enforcing agencies, the tobacco manu-
facturers and the public at large, one assumption which is basic to the
remaining discussion should be clearly stated. It is that conditions in
the tobacco industry, cannot be naively dismissed as the result of a com-
prehensive but cleverly concealed agreement among the big manufac-
turers to fix prices, control the market and suppress competition. The
lack of evidence of any actual plan or agreement among the policy-
making officials of the Big Three suggests that while there was some
collusion.among company representatives, the practices and policies' dur-
ing the 1937-40 period actually at issue12 3 were rather the ordinary
manufacturing corporations averaged 15.8%. The average annual return of tobacco
wholesalers and jobbers during this period was 4.43%. On the retail level, chain
groceries averaged 16.4%, chain drug stores, 8.29%, and chain tobacco stores lost
an average of 1.37% annually. Hearings before the Temporary National Economic
Committee, 76th Cong.. 1st Sess. 1816-21 (1939).
ARNOLD, THE BOTTLENECK OF BUSINESS 34 (1940); BURNS, THE DECLINE
OF COMPETITION 225-8, 383 (1936); Cox, CoMPETITIoN IN THE AMERICAN TOBACCO
INDUSTRY 316-24 (1933); HANDLER, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON TRADE
REGULATION 404 n. 80 (1937) ; LYNCH, THE CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER
136 (1946).
... Record, pp. 26, 29.
122 Reply Brief of Appellant American Tobacco Co., p. 6. See also Petition
for Certiorari of Appellant Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., pp. 7-8; Petition for
Certiorari of Appellant R. J.. Reynolds Tobacco Co., pp. 5-7, 10; Brief for the
United States in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari, p. 37; Record, pp. 458-9.
12. Under the federal three-year statute of limitations the defendants could only
be convicted for offenses committed between July 24, 1937 and July 24, 1940. 19
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features of an indugtry characterized by monopolistic competition.
The independent, rational reactions of businessmen in such an en-
vironment produce practices and policies strikingly similar or even
identical to those of their competitors. While this result may be con
demned as economically and socially undesirable, it need not be the
outgrowth of criminal conspiracy in the usual sense. Conviction and
punishment of the "conspirators" would not alone bring about any
appreciable change in business conduct. Undeniably, in the six years
since the tobacco companies were first pronounced guilty there has been
little outward change. In October, 1946 when American increased the
net price of Lucky Strikes from $6.25 to $6.50 per thousand and the
other companies followed, Reynolds only raised the price of Camels to
$6.48,124 but this hardly signifi~s the restoration of price competition
to the industry.125
The enforcing agencies. Entirely apart from its direct effect on the
individual and corporate defendants, however, the decision in this case
has contributed to the development of federal antitrust law and given
new encouragement to the agencies responsible for freeing the channels
of interstate commerce from the restrictive pressures of monopoly. The
federal courts, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, the
Federal Trade Commission, and aggrieved persons'2 6 are all figures in
this enforcement picture. They confront today in every major industry
STAT. 32 (1876), as amended, 45 STAT. 51 (1927), 18 U. S. C. §582 (1940). How-
ever, the Supreme Court stated: "Because of the circumstantial nature of most of
the evidence and because of the essentiality of figures for comparative years in
establishing any restraint of trade or monopoly, the record also contains much
important material drawn from earlier years." American Tobacco Co. v. United
States, 328 U. S. at 790. But cf. Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 157 F. 2d 533, 545-9 (C. C. A. 7th 1946).
... Tobacco, Oct. 10, 1946, p. 3, Oct. 17, 1946, p. 3.
1"5 Since a package of Camels still costs the consumer just as much as a pack
of Luckies or Chesterfields (dismissing a possible one or two cent difference per
carton as insignificant), Reynolds' move cannot be expected to increase sales vol-
ume, unless the broader margin for distributors encourages them to push Camels.
The loss to Reynolds on a volume of 88,500,000,000 cigarettes (their 1946 sales)
could be $1,770,000. But the two-cent differential does not mean that basic con-
ditions in the industry have changed. "Uniformity or identity does not connote
in this context that the prices of competitors are invariably the same. It is suffi-
cient if, considering all the circumstances, the prices or bids are substantially alike
or virtually identical. In other words, slight variations or studied differences do
not negate uniformity or identity, but the degree of variation must necessarily be
limited." HANDLER, A STUDY OF THE CONSTRUCTION- AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 36 (TNEC Monograph 38, 1941).
..8 Any individual or corporation who is injured by a violation of federal anti-
trust laws may bring a civil action for treble damages, 26 STAT. 210 (1890), 38
STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §15 (1940). An aftermath of the Government's
victory over the Big Three was a suit in the federal district court in New York
by the Monticello Tobacco Co. against American, Liggett and Reynolds and their
officials. Monticello alleged that it had suffered $12,000,000 damages because of
defendants' restrictive practices and monopolistic control over tobacco distribution,
and it requested treble damages of $36,000,000. N. Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1946,
p. 35, col. 4.
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striking concentrations of power and production in the hands of a few
giant corporations. Such concentration is by nature monopolistic, and
unless attack under the Sherman Act can destroy it, competition cannot
possibly be effective and cannot be relied on to regulate the economy in
the public interest.
In, at least three ways thp American Tobacco Company case points
the way toward renewed assault on this modem form of monopoly. In
the first place, the decision means that unanimity of action in industries
characterized by monopolistic competition may be a form of "con-
spiracy" in restraint of trade made illegal by the Antitrust Act.127 Under
broad, settled instructions on criminal conspiracy a jury may easily infer
that the features of business conduct paraded before its eyes are wholly
attributable to an agreement, combination and conspiracy among cor-
porate officers and representatives. The same inference may be drawn
by the judge in a civil suit to enjoin violations of the Act.128
Of course, an appellate court may reverse this conclusion as not
sustained by the evidence, but Judge McAllister's opinion in the circuit
court of appeals demonstrates that he too relies heavily on identity of
conduct as proof of conspiracy:
"The identical objectives, the opportunity for communication
between appellants in formulating policies for their mutual benefit,
their concert of action in other matters in which they were mutually
interested, their refusal to participate in .buying at the markets
unless all three appellant companies were present, the uniformity
of list prites of their manufactured products, the identical and
(for all practical purposes) simultaneous price increases and.price
reductions, their insistence on identical list prices, the similar re-
wards and punishments meted out to dealers by all the appellants
in carrying out the same objectives, their policies which, in prac-.
tice, resulted in their refusal to compete with each other in the
field of prices, either in the purchase of leaf tobacco or in the sales
of their finished products, are all circumstances . . . from which
an agreement on the part of the appellants to act in concert, to the
extent and in the manner outlined by the court, could be inferred
by the jury beyond a.reasonable doubt."'2
Three Supreme Court cases support the view that uniformity of
prices and policies among business competitors may amount to illegal
conspiracy. In Cement Manufacturers' Ass'n v. United States 30 de-
fendants testified and argued that uniformity of prices in the industry
..7 Comer, Price Leadership, 7 -LAw & CONTMP. PROB. 61 (1940), suggests
this technique for handling the similar problem of price leadership. -I"8 Section 4 invests federal courts with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain
violations of the Act and places on the federal district attorneys, under the direc-
tion of the Attorney General, the duty of instituting the necessary proceedings in
equity. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §4 (1940).
..
9 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F. 2d at 113.
1.10268 U. S. 588 (1925).
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was symptomatic of competition, but the Court stated in a dictum: "We
realize also that uniformity of prices may be the result of agreement or
understanding, and that an artificial price level not related to the supply
and demand of a given commodity may be evidence from which such
agreement or understanding, or some concerted action of sellers to
restrain commerce, may be inferred."' 3 1
The Interstate Circuit case13 2 in 1939 developed further this prin-
ciple of monopolistic conspiracy. A chain theater operator addressed a
letter to eight motion picture distributors proposing price and other
restrictions in their contracts with subsequent-run theaters in the oper-
ator's territory. Evidence of unanimous acceptance of the restrictions
for part of the territory and rejection for other parts, and of strong
motives for unanimity of action among the distributors, together with
failure of high officials of the distributors to testify, was held sufficient
to sustain a finding of conspiracy among the distributors, even though
no agreement or communication among them was shown. Justice Stone
declared that in the circumstances an actual agreement was not a pre-
requisite to an unlawful conspiracy. "It was enough that, knowing that
concerted action was contemplated and invited, the distributors gave
their adherence to the scheme and participated in it.' ' 1 a3
The reasoning of the Interstate Circuit case was followed in United
States v. Masonite Corp., 34 a 1942 decision. Although the restrictive
"agency" agreements between Masonite and eight or more manufacturers
or distributors of building materials were made separately and inde-
pendently, the awareness of each manufacturer or distributor that its
contract with Masonite was part of a larger arrangement was held
sufficient to support a finding of illegal combination and conspiracy.
Certiorari has been granted recently in a case which should clarify
the effect of uniformity of prices and practices in antitrust actions. 135
Actually the proceeding is not under the Sherman Act but is for review
of a Federal Trade Commission order enjoining the cement industry's
use of the multiple basing point pricing system as an unfair method of
" Id. at 605-6. The Government's suit challenged the statistical and credit
activities of the trade association. The Court, in a 6 to 3 decision, found that the
prosecution did not rely on agreement or understanding and held that the trade
association activities did not contravene §1 of the Act. Id. at 604-6.
232 Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U. S. 208 (1939), noted in 52 HARV.
L. REv. 846 (1939) and 23 MIN.. L. Rrv. 689 (1939).
.. 306 U. S. at 226; accord, Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 150 F. 2d 877
(C. C. A. 7th 1945), rev'd on other grounds, 327 U. S. 251 (1946); William
Goldman Theatres v. Loew's Inc., 150 F. 2d 738 (C. C. A. 3d 1945), reversing 54
F. Supp. 1011 (E. D. Pa. 1944) : "Uniform participation by competitors in a par-
ticular system of doing business where each is aware of the other's activities, the
effect of which is restraint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an
unlawful conspiracy under the statutes before us." 150 F. 2d at 745.
1316 U. S. 265 (1942).
.. Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 157 F. 2d 533
(C. C. A. 7th 1946), cert. granted, 57 Sup. Ct. 967, 91 L. Ed. 786 (1947).
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competition. However, unfair methods of competition under Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act 36 include restraints of trade under
the Sherman Act,137 and the order is based on a finding that the cement
producers restrained price competition by agreement to employ the
basing point system. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, one judge dissenting, set aside the FTC order for lack of
evidence of an agreement or conspiracy. Its opinion ascribed the uni-
formity of prices among producers to the necessity of meeting com-
petitors' prices, and asserted that "there is no basis for the Commis-
sion's contention that the uniformity of delivered price was any evidence
of collusion between the sellers ....,ss
Price uniformity is not and should not be conclusive evidence of
collusion or conspiracy. In economics, uniformity of prices in a single
market at a moment of time is equally characteristic of pure competition,
pure monopoly, monopolistic competition, and collusive agreement among
sellers.139  But where neither the conditions of pure competition nor of
pure monopoly are present, as in the tobacco industry, uniformity and
stability of prices, combined with similarity of other practices and
policies, signify to the economist the existence of monopolistic com-
petition and to the lawyer evidence from which a conspiracy among the
few powerful producers to suppress competition may be inferred.
A second feature of significance to the enforcing agencies is the
relation of the Anterican Tobacco decision to the problem of price
leadership. Price leadership as" an industrial phenomenon exists where
as a result of custom or the dominance of one competitor the price and
other policies of a particular company are voluntarily followed by all
the other producers, without any agreement but simply because it appears
to be good business on their part. Since all producers adapt their prices
to those of the generally recognized leader, the leader exercises control
similar to that in a group agreement, prices move together and the price
set is the monopoly one.14 D While price leadership may be found in a
1 38 STAT. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U. S. C. §45 (1940).137 Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U. S. 457, 463,
465 (1941); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441,
453 (1922); Eugene Dietzgen Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 142 F. 2d 321, 326(C. C. A. 7th 1944).
*,*'Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. Federal Trade Conum'n; 157 F. 2d 533, 567(C. C. A. 7th 1946). But cf. Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
156 F. 2d 899 (C. C. A. 7th 1946), cert. denied, 67 Sup. Ct. 481 (1946) ; Milk &
Ice Cream Can Institute v. Federal Trade Cornm'n, 152 F. 2d 478 (C. C. A. 7th
1946) ; United States Maisters Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 152 F. 2d 161(C. C. A. "7th 1945); Eugene Dietzgen Co. v. Federal'Trade Comm'n, 142 F. 2d
321 (C. C. A. 7th 1944), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 730 (1944).
... HANDLER, A STUDY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE FED-
ERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 35 (TNEC Monograph 38, 1941).
... BURNs, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION cc. 3, 5 (1936); CHAMBERLIN, THE
THEORY OF MONOPOLI STIC COMPEITION 50 n. 1 (5th ed. 1946); Comer, Price
Leadership, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 61 (1940); Note, 29 CALIF. L. RErv. 507(1941).
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market of many sellers, it is more easily maintained and more common
where sellers are few and one of their number is dominant. Although
price competition is clearly eliminated, price leadership has been held
not a violation of the Sherman Act because the essential element of
agreement could not be proved.141
There is no recognized price leader in the tobacco industry, although
Reynolds has initiated more changes than any other company,142 and
price leadership was not involved or mentioned in the case. Yet the
inference of conspiracy drawn from identity of prices and practices may
yet circumvent the obstacle to antitrust action in.price leadership situa-
tions. The government can argue that uniformity of prices and the
custom of following the price leader flow from an understanding and
agreement among all producers to fix prices by tying them to the price
movements of the leader. Strong support for this approach is found
in Justice Douglas' language in the Masonite case:143
"Nor can the fact that Masonite alone fixed the prices and that
the other appellees never consulted with Masonite concerning them
make the combination any the less illegal. Prices are fixed when
they are agreed upon .... The fixing of prices by one member
of a group pursuant to express delegation, acquiescence, or under-
standing is just as illegal as the fixing of prices by direct, joint
action."144
The American Tobacco case's third contribution to antitrust law
enforcement is its expansion of the concept of "monopolization" under
Section 2 of the Act. Although loose combinations and conspiracies
have previously been held violations of Section 2 as well as Section
1,145 the monopoly section has been-confined largely to mergers, holding
-"1 United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U. S. 693, 708 (1927) ;
United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417, 448 (1920); Aetna
Portland Cement Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 157 F. 2d 533, 564 (C. C. A. 7th
1946) ; United States v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 47 F. 2d 288, 316 (E. D. Mo.
1931).
"I Of eleven changes since 1928, two were caused by tax increases, one was
granted by OPA at the request of all manufacturers, Reynolds initiated five and
American three. Cox, COMPETITION IN THE AmERICAN ToiAcco INDUSTRY 187-
218 (1933); ANN. REP. ON ToBAcco STATisTics (1937-46); STANDARD & POOR'S
ImusTRY SuRvEy: ToBAcco, Part II, T4-3, April 10, 1946; Tobacco, Oct. 10, 1946,p. 3.
... United States v. Masonic Corp.; 316 U. S. 265 (1942).
Id. at 275-6.
1
'SAssociated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1 (1945) (members of ass'n
agreed not to sell news to non-members and granted each member power to block
competitors from membership) ; Hartford-Empire Co.- v. United States, 323 U. S.
386 (1945), 324 U. S. 570 (1945) (manufacturers of glass-making machinery and
glass products through patents and agreements monopolized the industry) ; United
States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173 (1944) (combination of motion
picture exhibitors used buying power to coerce distributors and exclude competing
exhibitors).; United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U. S. 265 (1942) (price-fixing
combination among manufacturers and distributors of building materials) ; United
States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106 (1932) (consent decree involving monopolistic
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companies and integrated industrial combinations.14' This decision
demonstrates how effectively evidence of conspiracy among leading pro-
ducers to fix prices and eliminate competition may be used to prove
conspiracy to monopolize and group monopolization of an industry.
Every conspiracy in restraint of trade is-not a conspiracy to monopolize
nor a monopolization, 147 but where the conspiracy involves the largest
companies in an industry and a high combined percentage of total pro-
duction, monopoly powet is not difficult to prove. Thus, subject to as
yet undefined limitations on multiple punishment,148 actions may be
brought under both Sections 1 and 2 against the dominant corporations
in an industry characterized by a few big producers, differentiated prod-
ucts and identity of business conduct.
In its authoritative holding that exercise of power to exclude or
exclusion of competitors is not essential to monopolization, the Supreme
Court lightened the Government's burden in antitrust litigation 49 and
combination of Big Five meat packers) ; Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v.
United States, 226 U. S. 20 (1912) (trade and patent agreement among manu-
facturers fixing prices and restricting output) ; Swift & Co. v. United States, 196
U. S. 375 (1905) (conspiracy and combination among meat packing companies to
regulate prices and conditions in the industry).
1' See Handler, Industrial Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 32 CoL. L. RLv.
179 (1932).117"The crime defined by Section 1 is legally distinct from the crime defined
by Section 2. Offenses. under these sections are not identical even though all the
evidence is applicable to a count under Section 1, as well as to a count under
Section 2." American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F. 2d at 117. In United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 226 n. 59 (1940), Justice Douglas
states that the two sections overlap in that a monopoly under §2 is a species of
restraint of trade under §1. His distinguishing element is the "existence or
exertion of power to accomplish the desired objective." Thus a conspiracy to fix
prices may be an illegal 'restraint of trade though the parties lack power to fix
prices. Ibid. Judge Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.
2d 416 (1945) expressed the distinction as follows: "Starting, 'however, with the
authoritative premise that all contracts fixing prices are unconditionally prohibited,
the only possible difference between them and a monopoly is that while a monopoly
necessarily involves an equal, or even greater, power to fix prices, its mere ex-
istence might be thought not to constitute an exercise of that power. That dis-
tinction'is nevertheless purely formal; . .. it would .disappear as soon as the
monopoly began to operate; ... Indeed it would be absurd to condemn such con-
tracts unconditionally, and not to extend the condemnation to monopolies; for the
contracts are only steps toward that entire control which monopoly confers: they
are really partial monopolies." Id. at 427-8. Thus the additional factor which
makes a restraint of trade a monopoly is the existence of power to exclude com-
petitors, i.e., power to control the market or the industry.
" Defendants argued strenuously that their convicetion under counts of con-
spiracy in restraint of trade, monopolization and conspiracy to monopolize sub-
jected them to multiple punishment for the same offense, contrary to the Fifth
Amendment. Brief for Appellant American Tobacco Co., pp. 138-59; Brief for
Appellant Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., p. 80; Brief for Appellant R. J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., pp. 93-100. Justice Rutledge, in his concurring opinion, expressly
reserves judgment on this issue, which was not squarely within the limited
certiorari granted by the Court. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328
U. S. at 815-6.
14. See reply of the Attorney General to a question by a Congressional sub-
committee concerning the importance of the tobacco case. Staff Report of the
Monopoly Subcommittee of the House Small Business Committee, United States
vs. Economic Concentration and Monopoly, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 238 (1946).
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brought the legal concept of monopoly into closer harmony with the
economic concept. 150 In conjunction with the opinion of the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America,151 from which it quoted with approval, 152 the American
Tobacco case establishes the elements of an unlawful monopoly. The
monopoly may be a single company like the Aluminum Company, or a
combination and conspiracy of the leading companies in an industry,
like the tobacco companies. It must have power to exclude actual or
potential competitors and must intend to exercise that power.158 The
latter requirement is not of any "specific" intent, but only an intention
to conduct business operations along lines which may appear normal
and rational to businessmen but which have the effect of maintaining
the monopoly's hold on the market.154
The most obvious way to prove power to exclude is by evidence of
exclusion of actual competitors, driving them out of the market with
predatory practices, etc. Slightly more difficult is proof of exclusion of
potential competition by buying up new companies, natural resources,
raw materials, patents or trade marks, or perhaps by conducting large
scale advertising campaigns. That such action, even when considered
good business policy, may lay a company or combination open to a
charge of monopolizing is indicated by Judge Learned Hand's reply to
the Aluminum Company:
"It insists that it never excluded competitors; but we can think
of no more effective exclusion than progressively to embrace each
new opportunity as it opened, and to face every newcomer with
new capacity already geared into a great organization, having the
advantage of experience, trade connections and the elite of per-
sonnel. Only in case we interpret 'exclusion' as limited to manoeu-
vres not honestly industrial, but actuated solely by a desire to
"15 See Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47 YALE L. 3. 34 (1937).
The author states that the legal concept of monopoly has been restraint of compe-
tition, in both loose and integrated combination cases, and the economic concept
has been control of the market.
" 148 IF. 2d 416 (C. C. A. 2d 1945). This was a suit in equity brought under
§§1 and 2 of the Sherman Act to adjudge that defendant company was monopoliz-
ing the aluminum ingot market and to dissolve it. The Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit sat as the final appellate court under a statute authorizing
it to render a decision in lieu of a decision by the Supreme Court, where a quorum
of qualified justices could not be had in that Court. 32 STAT. 823 (1903), 15
U. S. C. §29 (1940), as amended, 58 STAT. 272 (1944), 15 U. S. C. §29 (Supp.
1946).
52 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. at 813-4.155 Id. at 809.
2'Judge Learned Hand summarized the element of intent as follows: "In
order to fall within §2, the monopolist must have the power to monopolize and
the intent to monopolize. To read the passage as demanding any 'specific' intent,
makes nonsense of it, for no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is
doing." United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 432 (C. C. A.
2d 1945), quoted in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. at 814.
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prevent competition, can such a course, indefatigably pursued, be
deemed not 'exclusionary.' -155
In the final analysis, power to exclude competitors is simply another
term for power to control the market, which is a practical economic
description of monopoly :156 ,.... monopoly may be said to exist when-
ever a single seller or a number of sellers acting in unison control
enough of the supply of a broadly defined commodity to enable them
to augment their profit by limiting output and raising price."'157 Control
of the market may be evidenced by a combination's proportion of total
production or sales, behavior of prices and output, relation of prices
and costs, profits before and after the combination, presence of business
practices such as price discrimination, price stability and others, and
existence of potential competition. 58 The complexity of the legal stand-
ard, the necessity of weighing different factors, and the diversity of
industrial situations undoubtedly mean that in the future, as in the past,
each case will be a decision on its own individual facts, of limited
applicability as a precedent.
One qualification must be added. The fact that a company or com-
bination has monopoly power, power to control the market and exclude
competitors, is not alone sufficient to condemn it. Use of the active
verb "monopolize" in the statute leaves open an avenue of escape for
the combination which can show that it has a natural monopoly, that it
did not achieve or acquire monopoly but had monopoly "thrust upon
it."'159 However, this loophole is likely to prove too narrow for fre-
quent use.' 60
The tobacco companies. To the tobacco manufacturers the decision
seems to convict them for conspiracy when they have not conspired,
to condemn their past activities without furnishing a guide for future
conduct. With one voice they ask what they must do to avoid .future
prosecution under the Sherman Act.' 6' If the defendants actually
" United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 431 (C. C. A.
2d 1945).
15 Mason, supra note 150, at 41-2.
" WILCOX, COMPEITION AND MONopOLY Ix AMERIcAN INDUsTRY 10 (TNEC
Monograph 21, 1940).25 Mason, supra note 150, at 42; cf. Handler, Industrial Mergers and the Anti-
trust Laws, 32 CoL. L. REv. 179, 243-71 (1932).
""9 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 429 (C. C. A.
2d 1945).200 Judge Hand gives three abstract examples of monopoly "by force of acci-
dent": (1) A market may be so limited that it is impossible to produce at all and
meet the cost of production except by a plant large enough to supply the whole
demand. (2) Changes in taste or in cost may drive out all but one producer.
(3) A single producer may be the survivor out of a group of active competitors,
merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and industry. Id. at 430.
'"
2 Petition for Certiorari of Appellant Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., p. 5;
Petition for Certiorari of Appellant R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., pp. 12-13; Reply
Brief of Appellant American Tobacco Co., pp. 6-7. According to Liggett at the
argument in the circuit court of appeals Government counsel was asked how an
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engaged in a conspiracy or agreement, express or tacit, the simple answer
is abandonment of the conspiracy. But if the basic practices and policies
of the companies which convicted them were the natural features of
business conduct in a monopolistic competitive industry, the answer is
not so obvious. Perhaps by merely operating their businesses under
these conditions the companies are contravening the policy of the Act
and creating evidence of new violations.
Of course, the Big Three can learn from past mistakes. They prob-
ably will not hike the price of cigarettes at the bottom of the next
depression. If cheaper cigarettes are demanded they can produce new
economy brands of their own rather than lose sales to 'competing manu-
facturers. If control of distributors' prices seems desirable this may be
accomplished legally in the forty-five states which have resale price
maintenance statutes.162 Buyers, supervisors and salesmen may be care-
fully instructed to shun practices which create an impression of collusion.
Slight departures from identical factory prices, such as Reynolds 1946
move, may have some small value as evidence for the defendants in
another antitrust case.
But all these precautions will not change the fundamental similarity
or identity of conduct among the major producers. For American,
Reynolds and Liggett the only real answer is a frank recognition that
the tobacco industry is not automatically regulated in the public interest
by the Unseen Hand of classic competition, that within broad limits
the policies made and administered by each company determine for the
industry prices, production, wages, nature of product, use of resources,
and relation to the economy as a whole. It follows that these policies
must taken into consideration the interests of farmers, laborers, store-
keepers and consumers, as well as the interests of the corporations and
their stockholders. And, ironically enough, if ofie of the Big Three
adopts farsighted and beneficent policies the very conditions which led
to identical monopolistic practices will force the others to follow the
new and wiser lead. Such a course of action might not constitute a
legal defense under antitrust law but as a practical matter it would
render the industry virtually immune to prosecution.
The public. The final decision in the tobacco case must raise in the
public mind many more questions than it settles, questions of vital,
practical import. Must the tobacco industry be prosecuted periodically
for Sherman Act violations? Did the 1911 decree fail to establish corn-
injunction' should read if the case were a civil action; he replied that the com-
panies should be enjoined, from conspiring in the manner alleged in the complaint,
that is, from employing similar practices in the conduct of their business. Petition
for Certiorari of Appellant Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., p. 5.
I2 NATIONAL WHOLESALE DRUGGISTS' Ass'N, THE BASIS AND DEVELOPMENT
oF FAIR TADE 53 (1946).
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petition? Will the 1946 case restore competition and prevent monopoly?
Are heavier fines or jail sentences the answer? Can competition be
restored to the industry? If so, how? Is competition as the principle
regulating force in this and other industries desirable? Should a larger
measure of government control be introduced? If so, what kind and
what degree of control?
The answers to some of these searching inquiries are fairly clear;
others evoke differences of opinion which time alone will resolve. From
his study of the industry in 1932 Cox concluded that the 1911 decree
failed to produce anything more than non-price competition (advertis-
ing, etc.) among the few large manufacturers. The benefits to society
from this type of competition, whatever they may be, are not the eco-
nomic consequences promised by competition in the traditional sense.1 3
If the dissolution decree of 1911 did not revive competition surely one
would be rash to predict greater success for the recent conviction and
punishment of the Big Three. Events from 1940 to 1947 confirm
expectations based on economic analysis-there has been no real change
in the industry, competition still means rivalry in publicity and promo-
tion, concentration and monopoly power have not been broken: Nor
would heavier fines or jailing individual defendants have re-created
competition in the industry as long as basic conditions remained
unchanged. 16 4
Faced with this problem, the failure of antitrust action alone to
preserve competition, the public must decide, consciously or -uncon-
sciously, on a future policy toward this and similar segments of the
economy. Three main roads are open. The first is to accept conditions
as they are, to depend on non-price competition, the presence of sub-
stitutes, the existing elasticity of demand, the possibility of new com-
petition, the fear of antitrust -prosecution and the wisdom and restraint
of business leaders to protect the public from the evils of monopoly.
This policy is a "free enterprise" approach if that term means freedom
from further governmental regulation or interference. It avoids the
difficulties and uncertainties of attempting to restore effective competi-
tion or to devise a workable substitute. The industry if left alone would
probably continue to produce large quantities and varieties of tobacco
products, to use efficient methods of'machine production, to maintain
stable selling prices, profits and dividends, and to contribute financial
"I Cox, CoMPETIIox IN THE AMERICAN ToBAcco INDUsTRY 316-24 (1933).
"'The Department of Justice admits this. "For example, criminal action
against the three largest cigarette manufacturers . . . resulted in fines of $255,000.
. . . It is doubtful that this criminal action will change the high degree of con-
centration already existing in the industry and affect the preponderant economic
power enjoyed by them. The Justice Department in its answer recognizes this
and indicates that it is presently considering the advisability of taking civil action."
Staff Report of the Monopoly Subcommittee, supra note 149, at 35.
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support to newspapers, magazines, radio broadcasting and other adver-
tising media.
But there are decided disadvantages inherent in such a course. The
factors which are relied on to protect consumers, distributors, small
competitors, workers and farmers from injury have not protected them
in the past and can hardly be expected to do so in the future. One
fact about the industry is highly significant. Production and consump-
tion of cigarettes, the leading product, has been steadily expanding for
over thirty years. This long-run growth of total demand has unques-
tionably had a salutary influence in the determination of industrial
policy by the Big Three. With annually expanding sales volume
maximum profits may be obtained at prices lower than the static
monopoly price. But it is almost inevitable that some day the rise in
per capita consumpti6n will cease and production will either increase
slowly, remain constant or even decline. When this happens an im-
portant restraint on the industry's monopolistic tendencies will have
been removed and the policies and practices of the major companies
may become intolerable.165
Without effective competitive pressure, high prices, inferior quality,
inefficiency, excess productive capacity and resistance to economic change
are likely to characterize the industry. As Judge Hand puts it in the
Aluminum case:
"Indeed, even though we disregard all but economic consider-
ations, it would by no means follow that such concentration of
producing power is to be desired, when it has not been used ex-
tortionately. Many people believe that possession- of unchallenged
economic power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and de-
presses energy; that immunity from competition is a narcotic,
and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur
of constant stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable dis-
position to let well enough alone." 166
In addition to economic, there are also social and political objections
to such concentrations of economic power as exist in the tobacco and
other major manufacturing industries. They contribute to inequality
of income distribution, accentuate the separation of corporate ownership
and control, reduce individual initiative arid independence, weaken the
system of free private enterprise, lead to demands for more governmental
supervision and control, and beget a concentration of power in the state
which endangers representative democracy.
A second approach to the problem adopts the traditional policy of
antitrust law-restoration and maintenance of competition as the prin-
1. Cox, su pra note 163, at 320-1.
'"' United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 427 (C. C. A.
2d 1945).
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ciple regulator of industry. There are, of course, some areas of the
economy which are less conducive to competition than others,1 T but
manufacture of tobacco products is not one of them. No natural re-
sources would be wasted by competition in this industry. No public
utility function demands unified control and development. No tech-
nological factors of production necessitate plants or enterprises as
large as American, Liggett or Reynolds. 68 Workable competition 69
can be restored to the industry, but not by half-hearted attempts to
achieve a painless solution. Concentration and monopoly must be broken
and loosening their grip is always painful.
A positive program to revive competition must have for its goal the
creation of conditions essential to competition-a large number of inde-
pendent sellers, standardized or readily substituted products, and the
threats of potential competition. Two methods of establishing a suffi-
cient number of independent sellers suggest themselves. One is disso-
lution of the seven defendant manufacturing corporations into many
small companies, plus continuing efforts to maintain easy ingress into
the industry. The other is to leave the present firms intact but actively
retard their operations and stimulate the formation and growth of new
enterprises. Either course would require vigorous antitrust law en-
forcement to prevent collusive agreement or coercive suppression of
new competition. And vigorous enforcement will continue to be im-
possible until adequate staffs and funds are provided the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Com-
mission.170
Dissolution of the tobacco corporations could not be ordered in an
antitrust suit under present law because the violation charged would
be conspiracy and combination of independent firms; destruction of the
separate entities would not appear logically or legally necessary to
1'7 See WnLcox, supra note 157, at 14-16.
"' "It seems necessary to conclude that in the tobacco industry while the large
factory has a decided advantage over the small, there is a very broad range of
sizes within which plants are approximately comparable in economic efficiency."
Cox, supra note 163, at 111. Cox points out that the advantages in large enter-
prises (as distinct from large plants) are in financial administration and sales
promotion rather than in technology. Id. at 112-5.
"9 Workable or effective competition among sellers is not necessarily pure or
perfect competition but is a condition which offers buyers real alternatives suffi-
cient to enable them, by shifting their purchases from one seller to another, sub-
stantially to influence quality, service, and price. WILcox, supra note 157, at 8-9.
'"Two instances illustrate the disparity between federal appropriations and the
magnitude-of the job. In the recent cement industry case three FTC attorneys
opposed lawyers from forty-one law firms, and defendant companies spent over
$5,000,000 on the case, or about twice the annual FTC appropriation. Staff Report
of the Monopoly Subcommittee, supra note 149, at 29. In Hartford-Empire Co.
v. United Staes, 323 U. S. 386 (1945) defendants spent an estimated $2,000,000,
or considerably more than the average annual .appropriation for the whole Anti-
trust Division; five attorneys for the Division opposed thirty for the defense. Id.
at 47.
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destroy the conspiracy and combination.171 The new legislation needed
might prescribe corporate dissolution as a penalty for antitrust violation,
the details -to be worked out by an administrative agency. Or it might
take the form of a federal incorporation law limiting the size and power
of corporations in interstate commerce, with gradual dissolution of
firms which exceeded the permissible limits. One of the thorniest
aspects of dissolution in the tobacco industry would be disposition of
trade-marks and brand names; perhaps use of present brand names
by. any of the newly created corporations would be the only practical
solution.
If not dissolved, the major companies would have to be held back,
not only by watchful antitrust supervision, but also by positive measures
to give small manufacturers a competitive advantage. To secure a
proportional tax burden for the cheaper cigarettes the federal cigarette
tax should be graduated according to the retail prices of the brands, like
the rates on cigars. 172 To reduce the burden of large capital investment
in leaf tobacco inventory and to bolster the farmers' bargaining power
government owned or financed redrying and storage warehouses should
be established for the use of growers, buyers and manufacturers. To
prevent elimination of firms by consolidations or mergers the Federal
Trade Commission should be given authority to forbid acquisition of
the stock or assets of competing corporations unless such action is in
the public interest and will not lessen competition. 78
"71 On the general problem of dissolution see Hale, Trust Dissolution: "Atom-
i5n" Business Units of Monopolistic Size, 40 COL. L. REv. 615 (1940).
"'2Large cigars are divided into seven tax rate classes, according to their
retail prices, which vary from' 2/2 cents each or less in Class A to more than
20 cents each in Class G, whereas all small cigarettes are taxed at the same rateper thousand. ANN. REP. ON TOBACCO STATiscs 50 (U. S. Dep't Agric. 1946).
This means that buyers of "economy" cigarettes are paying a proportionately larger
amount in taxes than smaokers of the "popular" brands. The Federal Trade Com-
mission has recommended a graduated cigarette tax as an aid to competition.
Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee, Part 5A, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2392 (1939).
... Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §18 (1940),
prohibits a corporation's acquisition of part or all of the stock of another corpora-
tion where the effect may be to substantially lessen competition between them, or
to restrain commerce, or tend to create a monopoly. The obvious weakness of
the statute, its failure to prohibit acquisition of assets of another corporation, was
compounded by Supreme Court decisions holding that the Federal Trade Com-
mission could not order divestiture of assets obtained by unlawful stock purchases,
even where such assets were transferred after the commencement of FTC pro-
ceedings for divestiture of the stock. Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric Co. v. Fed-
eral Trade Comm'n, 291 U. S. 587 (1934); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Western
Meat Co., 272 U. S. 554 (1926). Since these decisions the merger process has
gone merrily on, and the high degree of concentration in many industries today
is largely attributable to mergers and consolidations among competitors. The
tragic futility of attempting through antitrust litigation to dissolve combinations
which should have been caught in their inception has led to repeated recommenda-
tions for legislative reform. See President Truman's Economic Report to Con-
gress, N. Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1947, p. 15, col. 1; Temporary National Economic
Committee, Final Report and Recommendations, SEN. Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong.,
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Measures short of dissolution would have to reckon with the dif-
ferentiation of product and extensive brand advertising of the leading
companies. Grade labeling of tobacco products under government in-
spection and standards would enable consumers to distinguish between
quality of product and superior sales promotion. Legislation providing
for forfeiture of trade marks and trade names upon proof of their use
in antitrust violations would be constructive. But new brand names
can be publicized and promoted, and as long as huge advertising cam-
paigns are essential to sales volume new firms will not enter the industry
and potential competition will not effectively limit rihonopoly power. A
way must be found to restrict sales promotion or confine it to class of
commodity rather than particular brand (i.e., cigarettes generally rather
than Luckies or Camels). Restriction of this protective device of
monopoly offers the only hope for the evolution of a tobacco industry
of many producers and effective competition.
If the public decides that some action is necessary but workable
competition cannot be revived in the industry, a.third course is avail-
able-determination of industrial policy by a governmental agency.
Wartime experience with price control proves that this is entirely feasible
and can produce desired results.
On December 27, 1941, American announced a price increase on
Lucky Strike cigarettes, and upon refusal of the company to rescind the
increase voluntarily pending investigation, the Price Administrator, act-
ing under executive authority 74 (later superseded by the Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942175), froze all manufacturers' cigarette prices
at levels prevailing on December 26, 1941.176 No change in the net
price of Lucldes, Camels, Chesterfields and other popular or standard
brands was permitted from that date until April, 1946, but an increase
1st Sess. 38 (1941). Although the leading manufacturers of tobacco products
achieved their present postion chiefly through expansion rather than acquisition of
competing companies, the old American Tobacco case presented flagrant examples
of such acquisition, and even in the 1911-47 period mergers have not been unknown
in the industry.' From 1932 to 1938 there were acquisitions or consolidations in
which companies with total assets of $3,700,000 acquired companies with assets of$10,600,000. Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee, Part
5A, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 2376 (1939). And in 1944 Philip Morris purchased for$8,925,000 the properties, trade-marks, brands and good will of Axton-Fisher
Tobacco Co., a manufacturer of cheaper cigarettes. MOODY'S INDUSTRIALS 2684
(1946).
""' Exec. Order No. 8734, 6 FED. REG. 1917 (1941), No. 8875, 6 FED. REG. 4483(19)"6 STAT. 23 (1942), as amended, 50 U. S. C. §§901-946 (Supp. 1946).
1
~
8OPA Revised Price Schedule No. 62-Cigarettes (as amended), 7 FED. REG.
1332, 1836, 2132, 2242: 8948 (1942), 9 FED. REG. 2667 (1944), 11 FED. REG. 4609(1946). The Schedule fixed a maximum list price of $5.15 per thousand for
economy cigarettes, allowed manufacturers to continue or add to existing "drop"
shipm nts, free deals and coupon practices, and provided for a price rise if the
federal cigarette tax should be increased. The Schedule's effective date was
Dec. 30, 1941.
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in maximum prices of economy cigarettes was granted by the Office of
Price Administration in September, 1943.177 On April 25, 1946, in
response to appeals based on higher manufacturing costs, the Price
Administrator raised the ceiling price of the popular brands 25 cents
per thousand.178  And in October of the same year, after price controls
had been removed, 'the companies, led by American, added another 25
cents per thousand to their net cigarette prices. 179
During the four years in which net manufacturers' prices on pop-
ular brands remained unchanged cigarette production rose 52%,180
per capita consumption 47%b.181 Average prices of flue-cured tobacco
increased 56%, burley tobacco 35% and Maryland tobacco 89%,182
but the steady upward trend of production enabled cigarette manufactur-
ers to absorb these increases in raw material costs without a rise in
product prices.18 3  However, with stationary cigarette prices and ad-
vancing costs the expansion of sales volume could not prevent a sub-
stantial effect on profits. From 1941 to 1945 American, Reynolds,
Liggett, Philip Morris and Lorillard increased not only their production
of cigarettes but also their share of the total market, 8 4 but profits
dropped both absolutely 18 5 and relatively. These firms' ratio of net
income (after taxes) to net worth averaged 12.23% in 1941, 11.46%
in 1942, 9.92% in 1943, 8.98% in 1944 and 8.85% in 1945.18l In
1946, the year in which two price rises occurred, profits started upward
again with a figure of 10.25 % of net worth.1 87  This first post-war year
1-7 OPA Revised Price Scheduile No. 62-Cigarettes, Amendment 2, 9 FE. REG.
2667 (1944). The list price ceiling was raised from $5.15 to $5.82 a thousand.78 OPA Revised Price Schedule No. 62-Cigarettes, Amendment 4, 11 FED.
REG. 4609 (1946).
Tobacco, Oct. 10, 1946, p. 3, Oct. 17, 1946, p. 3.
ANN. REP. ON ToBAcco STATISTIcs 46 (U. S. Dep't Agric. 1946). The 1941
figure was 217.9 billion cigarettes; the 1945 total was 332:2 billion.1811d. at 47. Per capita consumption was 1,580 in 1941 and 2,330 in 1945;
figures for both years include U. S. armed forces overseas.
... Id. at 15-16. A comparison of average leaf tobacco prices (in cents per
pound) for the base period 1936-39 and the years of cigarette price control follows:
Year Fhw-cured Burley Maryland
1936-39 20.6 23.0 20.5
1941 28.1 29.2 30.1
1942 38.4 41.8 56.5
1943 40.2 45.6 45.3
1944 42.4 44.0 55.5
1945 43.7 39.4 56.8
18 OPA Revised Price Schedule No. 62-Cigarettes, Amendment 4, Statement
of Considerations, 11 FED. REG. 4609 (1946).
18, The leading brands of these five companies increased their share of total
domestic production from 72% to 84% during the period. STANDARD & POOR's
INDUsTRY SuRvEY: ToBAcco, Part II, T4-5, April 10, 1946.
185 Combined net income, before taxes and reserves, for the five companies was
$133,000,000 in 1941 and $127,000,000 in 1945. MOODY'S INDUSTRIALS 1957, 1970,
2439, 2480, 2684 (1946), and prior years.
188 Ibid.
187 MOVDY'S INDUsTRIALS (Manual Service 1947).
[Vol. 26
1948] THE AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY CASE 171
also saw a renewal of the huge advertising expenditures which had been
severely cut during the war. 18
This record of the tobacco industry under price control demon-
strates that cigarette prices can be effectively regulated in the public
interest without curbing production or precluding non-price competition
and reasonable profits for producers. Nor does price control at the
manufacturers' level necessarily imply control of distributors' prices;
competition among the thousands of wholesale and retail outlets can be
relied on to keep prices at reasonable figures. Minimum prices might
have to be established for leaf tobacco, however, if the present federal
govrenment quota systm'89 does not protect the tobacco farmers against
depressed prices caused by the small number of buyers in the auction
markets.
Whi~hever public policy is adopted, whether reliance on existing
conditions, action to restore effective competition or regulation by an
administrative agency, the decision should be based on thorough investi-
gation and full information on all phases of the tobacco business. If it
achieves no other tangible and immediate goal, the recent antitrust
prosecution of the major companies has disclosed the basic facts of
industry operations over the past thirty years, facts which are essential
for any satisfactory answer to the serious questions raised by the final
judicial decision.
CoNCLUSION
In the American Tobacco Company case the Government won a legal
victory. It convicted the leading tobacco companies of antitrust viola-
tions. It applied the Sherman Act to the most prevalent form of monop-
oly in American industry and sharpened that Act's potentialities for the
future. But the Government did not win an economic victory, and
therein lies the fundamental weakness of our traditional antitrust policy.
If the persistent incursions of monopoly into the narrowing area of free
competitive enterprise are to be halted, effective sanctions must be devel-
188 N. Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1946. p. 32, Mar. 20, 1946, p. 29, April 26, 1946, p. 37.
188 The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 52 STAT. 31 (1938), as amended,
7 U. S. C. §§1281 et seq. (1940), imposes national, state and farm marketing quotas
for leaf tobacco when the Secretary of Agriculture finds that the total supply at
the beginning of the marketing year exceeds the "reserve supply level" as defined
in the Act, and when two-thirds of the tobacco farmers voting at a referendum
approve the imposition of quotas. The Act was held constitutional in Mulford v.
Smith, 307 U. S. 38 (1939). Another federal statute regulating tobacco market-
ing in the interest of the growers is the Tobacco Inspection Act, 49 STAT. 731
(1935), 7 U. S. C. §§511-511q (1940), which provides for government inspection
and grading of leaf tobacco at designated auction markets, in order to standardize
grades and furnish farmers with information necessary for intelligent market
decisions. This Act was held constitutional in Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1(1939).
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oped and applied to industries which are judicially declared monopolis-
tic. New federal legislation authorizing legal and economic measures
to revive competition and to maintain conditions essential for competition
in, such industries seems imperative. The alternative is abandonment of
competition and increasing reliance on state control and direction of the
economy in order to achieve the maximum economic benefits of a modem
scientific and industrial society.
